Smart Contract Development
  • Introduction
    • What is a Transaction
    • Accounts and Signing
    • What is a smart contract
  • Learning Solidity
    • Introduction
    • Module 1
      • Variable Types
      • Variable Scope: State & Local variables
      • Global variables
      • Functions
        • View and Pure
        • Shadowing in Fuctions
      • Mapping
      • Require
      • Events
    • Project #1: Simple Registry
    • Module 2
      • Constructor
      • Data Location: Value & Reference
      • Interface
      • Import
        • Importing in Foundry
      • Inheritance
      • ERC-20
      • Checks-effect-interaction pattern
    • Project #2: Basic Vault
    • Module 3
      • Payable
      • Receive
      • Fallback
      • Returns
    • Project #3: ERC20+ETH Wrapper
    • Module 4
      • Immutable and Constant
      • Fixed-point Math
      • Abstract contracts
      • ERC-4626
      • Modifier + Inheritance +Ownable
      • Type
    • Project #4: Fractional Wrapper
    • Module 5
      • If-else
      • Libraries
        • TransferHelper
      • Chainlink Oracle
    • Project #5: Collateralized Vault
  • Compendium
    • Solidity Basics
      • Variable Types
      • Value Types
        • address
        • enum
      • Reference Types
        • strings
        • mappings
        • struct
        • Arrays
        • Multi-Dimensional arrays
      • Global Objects
      • Functions
        • Function types
        • Constructor Function
        • Transaction vs Call
        • Require, Revert, Assert
      • Function signature + selectors
      • Payable
        • Payable + withdraw
        • msg.value & payable functions
      • Receive
      • Fallback function (sol v 0.8)
        • Fallback function (sol v 0.6)
      • call, staticcall, delegatecall
    • Return & Events
    • Control Variable Visibility
    • Local Variables (Storage v Memory)
    • Data Location and Assignment Behaviors
    • Modifiers & Inheritance & Import
      • import styles
    • Interface & Abstract Contracts
    • ABI & Debugging
    • Libraries
    • Conditional(ternary) operators
    • Smart Contract Life-cycle
      • Pausing Smart Contracts
      • Destroying Smart Contracts
    • Merkle Trie and MPT
    • Merkle Tree Airdrop
  • Try & catch
  • Ethereum Signatures
  • EVM, Storage, Opcodes
    • EVM
    • Wei, Ether, Gas
    • Storage
    • ByteCode and Opcodes
    • Transaction costs & Execution costs
  • Reading txn input data
  • Data Representation
  • Yul
    • Yul
      • Intro
      • Basic operations
      • Storage Slots
      • Storage of Arrays and Mappings
      • Memory Operations
      • Memory: how solidity uses memory
      • Memory: Return, Require, Tuples and Keccak256
      • Memory: Logs and Events
      • Inter-contract calls
      • calldata
      • free memory pointer
    • Yul Exercises
      • read state variable
      • read mapping
      • iterate Array, Return Sum
    • memory-safe
  • Upgradable Contracts
    • Upgradability & Proxies
    • UUPS Example
    • Minimal Proxy Example
    • TPP Example
    • 🚧Diamond
      • On Storage
  • Gas Opt
    • Block Limit
    • gasLimit & min cost
    • Solidity Optimiser
    • Memory v calldata
    • Memory caching vs direct storage vs pointers
    • < vs <=
    • reverting early
    • X && Y, ||
    • constant and immutable
    • caching sload into mload
    • Syntactic Sugar
    • using unchecked w/o require
    • Compact Strings
    • Calling a view function
    • Custom errors over require
    • usage of this.
      • multiple address(this)
  • ERCs & EIPs
    • ERC-20.sol
      • Core functions
      • transfer()
      • transferFrom()
      • TLDR transfer vs transferFrom
    • Landing
      • ERC721.sol
      • EIP-721
        • LooksRare
        • Page 1
      • ERC-1271
      • EIP-2981
      • ERC-165
      • EIP-1167: Minimal Proxy Contract
    • VRFConsumerBase
    • UniswapV2Library
  • Yield Mentorship 2022
    • Projects
      • #1 Simple Registry
      • #2 Basic Vault
      • #3 ERC20+ETH Wrapper
        • setFailTransferTrue
      • #4 Fractional Wrapper
      • #5 Collateralized Vault
        • Process
        • Vault.sol
        • Testing
        • Chainlink Oracles
        • Pricing + Decimal scaling
        • Refactor for Simplicity
      • #9 Flash Loan Vault
        • Implementing ERC3156
        • Full code for lender
        • Ex-rate calculation
    • State Inheritance Testing
    • Testing w/ Mocks
    • Yield Style Guide
    • Github Actions
    • TransferHelper.sol
    • math logic + internal fn
    • Interfaces: IERC20
  • Foundry
    • Overview
    • Importing Contracts
    • Testing
      • stdError.arithmeticError
      • assume vs bound
      • Traces
      • label & console2
      • std-storage
  • Smart Contract Security
    • Damn Vulnerable Defi
      • 1. Unstoppable
      • 2. Naive receiver
      • 3. Truster
      • 4. Side Entrance
      • 5. The Rewarder
      • 6. Selfie
      • 7. Compromised
      • 8. Puppet
      • 9. Puppet V2
      • 10 - Free Rider
    • Merkle Tree: shortened proof attack
  • Fixed-Point Math
    • AMM Math
  • Solidity Patterns
    • checks-effects-interactions pattern
    • Router // batch
    • claimDelegate: stack unique owners
    • claimDelegate: cache previous user
  • Array: dup/ascending check
  • Deployment
    • Behind the Scenes
    • Interacting with External Contracts
    • Logging, Events, Solidity, Bloom Filter
  • Misc
    • Mnemonic Phrases
    • Bidul Ideas
  • Archive
    • Brownie Framework
      • Brownie basics
        • storing wallets in .env
        • Deployment to ganache
        • Interacting with contract
        • Unit Testing
        • Testnet deployment
        • Interacting w/ deployed contract
        • Brownie console
      • Brownie Advanced
        • Dependencies: import contracts
        • helpful_scripts.py
        • verify and publish
        • Forking and Mocking
        • Mocking
        • Forking
      • Testing
      • Scripts Framework
        • deploy.py
        • get_accounts
        • deploy_mocks()
        • fund_with_<token>()
      • Brownie Networks
    • Brownie Projects
      • SharedWallet
        • Multiple Beneficiaries
        • Common Code Contract
        • Adding Events
        • Renounce Ownership
        • Separate Files
      • Supply Chain
        • ItemManager()
        • Adding Events
        • Adding unique address to each item
      • Lottery
      • Aave - Lending and Borrowing
        • Approve & Deposit
        • Borrow
      • NFT
      • Advanced Collectible
        • adv_deploy() + Testing
        • Create Metadata
        • Setting the TokenURI
    • node npm
    • Ganache
    • Truffle
    • Remix
    • Installing Env
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On this page
  • Buying
  • ecrecover
  • On signing and verifying using ECDSA
  • Security issues with ecrecover + solution
  1. ERCs & EIPs
  2. Landing
  3. EIP-721

Page 1

PreviousLooksRareNextERC-1271

Last updated 2 years ago

  • Seller creates a sell order -> sellOrder struct with relevant info (price, NFT addr)

  • sellOrder struct is hashed to get sellOrderDigest

  • The seller then signs an EIP-712 signature of the sell order’s hash, which is stored off-chain.

    • domainSeparator is a value unique to each domain that is ‘mixed in’ the signature - prevents collision of otherwise identical structures.

  • EIP-712’s standard encoding prefix is \x19\x01, so the final digest is bytes32 digest = keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19\x01", domainSeparator, hash));

    • (v, r, s are the values for the transaction's signature)

sellOrderDigest

  • sellOrderDigest is the keccak256 hash of all the MakerOrder properties set when creating an order and a constant value.

  • The constant value is the typehash

  • SELL_ORDER_TYPEHASH -> keccak256 hash of the SellOrder struct and its fields

  • typeHash is to separate types -> collision resistance

    • By giving different types a different prefix the hash function only has to be injective within a given type.

    • It is okay for hash(a) to equal hash(b) as long as typeOf(a) is not typeOf(b).

Every hash function is NOT injective. Hashes map a large domain to a significantly smaller codomain. By the pigeon-hole principle, such a function can't be injective, because there would be items in the domain that'll map to the same item in the codomain.

Buying

  • calculate the EIP721 digest of the sellOrder inputted

  • use ecrecover together with this digest and the v,r,s values to generate the signer address

  • check if this signer address generated matchs the one within the sellOrder.signer

ecrecover

  • recover the address of the private key that a message was signed with.

  • whenever you send a transaction to the Ethereum network, you have to sign this transaction with your private key. Ethereum nodes have some way to verify a signature.

  • This functionality of verifying a signature was added to the smart contract itself.

  • With this you can verify much more than just the transaction signature itself. In fact you can pass any data to a smart contract, hash it and then verify its signature against the data. The signature is the combination of v, r and s.

On signing and verifying using ECDSA

  • ECDSA signatures consist of two numbers (integers): r and s. Ethereum uses an additional v (recovery identifier) variable.

  • r and s (ECDSA signature outputs), v (recovery identifier)

r, s and v are obtained from the signature of the transaction.

var sig = secp256k1.sign(msgHash, privateKey)
r = sig.signature.slice(0, 32)
s = sig.signature.slice(32, 64)
v = sig.recovery + 27

v: recovery identifier

any r can generate two valid signatures, and a few of them can generate up to 4 (due to it being an elliptic curve). Each of them leads to the recovery of a different public key, and so we need a way to distinguish which is the real one.

This is why Ethereum signatures include a third element, the value v, called the recovery identifier

Security issues with ecrecover + solution

  1. In some cases ecrecover can return a random address instead of 0 for an invalid signature. This is prevented above by the owner address inside the typed data.

  2. An attacker can construct a hash and signature that look valid if the hash is not computed within the contract itself.

Signature are , meaning you might be able to create a second also valid signature for the same data. In our case we are not using the signature data itself (which one may do as an id for example).

malleable